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Increasing Social Capital for Disaster Response through 
Social Networking Services (SNS) in Japanese Local Governments 
 
Alexander R. M. Schellong 
J. W. Goethe- University, Frankfurt am Main 
Harvard University 
 
Researchers have argued that social networks within a community have positive effects on 
people’s behavior in the four stages of disaster. The Japanese government is testing Social 
Networking Service (SNS) at the municipal level with the intention to improve community 
building, democratic processes and disaster management. This paper presents results from two 
case studies of local SNS in Yatsushiro city, Kumamoto prefecture and Nagaoka city, Niigata 
prefecture. While the Yatsushiro’s solution seems to be sustainable, Nagaoka’s SNS is in decline. 
Both have to compete with popular SNS like Mixi and lack critical mass. Based on the reviewed 
literature I discuss the role of local SNS in social capital development and disaster. I also present 
the concept of an individual disaster profile for future local SNS version by practitioners.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whenever there is a natural or man made disaster we can observe an emerging community structure 
(Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). First, people help each other before they are supported or replaced by 
government entities. Administrators are trying to exploit this behavior in their disaster plans. When 
drafting preparation policies, however, they usually refer to people living in one geographical area as the 
community. Though, the idea of an all-embracing community and its territorial affiliation as a proxy 
would neglect its broadness beyond any area or underlying social networks based on shared interests and 
other factors (Durkheim, 1995/1965; Marsh & Buckle, 2001).  
What happens when this is neglected by government could be observed in the old districts of Kobe, 
where the subculture issue was dominant and homogeneous regulations where applied, which created 
subsequent problems with dissatisfaction among residents. It also became clear after the Kobe earthquake 
in 1995 that many people had weak links with the larger community because their livelihoods were not 
rooted in the community. Immediately after the earthquake these missing stronger ties would have had an 
enormous influence on the speed of recovery (Shaw & Goda, 2004).  Therefore, it is frequently asserted 
that vulnerability to natural hazards is directly related to a community’s level of development (Buckland 
& Rahman, 1999). The level of development is commonly evaluated by economic and social indicators 
measuring average levels of physical and human capital accumulation, for example, income, productivity, 
education and life expectancy. Indicators of physical and human capital accumulation ignore the 
importance of community decision-making and management capacity. Consequently, researchers and 
emergency managers alike are now bringing back their attention to better understand the community. 
Social capital is a useful concept that seeks to explain the characteristics required for effective and 
egalitarian community-based management capacity. There is evidence that a community which can be 
characterized by decentralized decision making through social networks using trusting and reciprocal 
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normative behavior leads to a more effective disaster response (Neal and Phillips 1995). At the same time 
technology is increasingly part of people’s daily interactions and social relationships.  
When using the term “Social Networking Services” (SNS) I refer specifically to social networking 
platforms such as Friendster, MySpace, Mixi or Xing. Social networking platforms gather information on 
users’ social contacts, their attributes (i.e. interests), construct interconnected social network, and reveal to 
users how they are connected to others in the network. 
It would be interesting to see how SNS can be utilized in or before a disaster. While, this exploratory 
study is not able to test this directly in a disaster it tries to do the following: First, the use of SNS has not 
been included in the discussion of researchers. Therefore, I take a closer look at the organizational 
arrangement, understanding, implementation and impact of local SNS through interviews of 
administrators, community- and NPO-members. Especially the perception of SNS, community and 
disaster of involved actors frame its implementation and utilization. Second, I try to find early proof that 
SNS can indeed be helpful before and in disaster by establishing a connection between research on social 
networking platforms, communities and disaster and the case findings. In general, the use of SNS by 
government in itself is an innovation and thus worthy of a detailed presentation and analysis.  
 
I present the study in five sections. I begin the study with a brief discussion of disaster, social 
networks, social capital and social software literature. I then describe my research procedures. A 
subsequent section presents the two case studies. Based on reference from the reviewed literature I discuss 
both cases before I present some ideas for practitioners. My concluding section points to further research. 
 
2. Disasters and social capital 
In order to conceptualize and research disaster one needs to define the social unit and the phase of a 
disaster. I use (Dynes, 1991) definition of disaster as a normatively defined occasion in a community 
when extraordinary efforts are taken to protect and benefit some social resource whose existence is 
perceived as threatened. Disasters are events that can be observed in time and space. These events include 
natural, technological, social hazards or circumstances. These events have impacts on social units which 
can be as small as an individual.  
The social units enact responses that are related to these impacts. The impacts include both physical 
damages and losses incurred by social units and the disruption of the unit’s routine functioning and within 
its network of other social units. I refer to this network of social units a social network embedded into a 
system of other networks. Individuals interacting in microstructures, are embedded in meso level 
structures, which in turn are linked to macro level structures (Tindall & Wellman, 2001).  
Social networks are presumed to be embedded in larger social systems some might refer to as a 
community which is not bound to one geographical area. The size of a network, its connectedness 
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(density), centrality, formalization, and hierarchy reflect important social conditions. (Streeter & Gillespie, 
1992). There is consensus that social capital consists of resources embedded in social networks and social 
structure, which can be mobilized by actors (Dynes, 2002). Social capital is defined by its function. It is 
not a single entity and can be characterized by two fundamentals: It has some aspect of social structures, 
and it facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure.  
 
Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors 
and among actors. If physical capital is wholly tangible, being embodied in observable material 
form, and human capital is less tangible, being embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by 
an individual, social capital is less tangible yet, for it exists in the relations among persons 
(Coleman, 1988).  
 
Social capital can also facilitate productivity and coordinated action (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Putnam, 
1993). Coleman gives the example of a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and 
extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without those assets (1988). 
Networks, particularly those characterized through weak ties (Granovetter, 1983) and structural holes 
(Burt, 2004) increase the efficiency of information diffusion through minimizing redundancy while at the 
same time encouraging cooperative/supportive behavior. Social capital therefore, lowers the transaction 
costs of information acquisition. One means by which information can be acquired is by use of social 
relations that are maintained for other purposes. A prescriptive norm within a community that constitutes 
an especially important form of social capital for the discussion of disaster is the norm that one should 
forgo self-interest and act in the interests of the collectivity. A norm of this sort, reinforced by social 
support, status, honor, and other rewards, is the social capital that builds young nations, strengthens 
families by leading family members to act selflessly in “the family’s” interest, facilitates the development 
of nascent social movements through a small group of dedicated, inward-looking, and mutually rewarding 
members, and in general leads persons to work for the public good (Coleman, 1988). In short, ones 
attachment to a community produces a willingness to contribute to its maintenance (Kasarda & Janowitz, 
1974) and it this sense of moral responsibility is what produces, in times of threat to the community, real 
like a disaster or perceived, collective action (Bensman & Vidich, 1995; Hunter & Suttles, 1972; 
Jannowitz, 1952). Furthermore, the social resources stream of network analysis has shown that success in 
a non-routine activity like job finding is enhanced by access to weak ties (Granovetter, 1983). Kin, non-
surprisingly serve as the most important sources of informal support in routine and crisis situation (Haines 
& Hurlbert, 1992; House, Umberson, & Landis, 1988; Vaux, 1992). Li has similar findings for the pre-
disaster period in her study of the Chinese Tangshan earthquake where the most frequently reported 
source of disaster information were relatives and friends (1991). In fact, access to social support is 
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associated with strong rather than weak ties and homophilous rather than heterophilous (Lin, Woelfel, & 
Light, 1985) and the dense networks that are associated with them (Hurlbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000). 
Wellman and Wortley note that  the support provided is often specialized according to the primary nature 
of the relationship (1990). This underlines Jannowitz’s concept of communities of limited liability (1952). 
Communities of limited liability are intentional, voluntary, and partial in the level of involvement they 
engender. Beyond this members share few ties. Commitment can be narrowly defined. While the produced 
negative and positive externalities of a group need to be determined from case to case (i.e.Yakuza versus 
Salvation Army), strong norms and mutual identities (homophily) can limit a social units’ openness to 
new information and to alternative ways of behavior, producing a form of collective blindness (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998). Heterodox individuals who have multiple group memberships and identities thereby 
are becoming bearers of new ideas and information.  
In line with Marsh and Buckle I assume that communities and their underlying social networks 
matter in disaster and beyond (2001). The impacted community is a direct and active participant at all 
distinct phases of dealing with a disaster which are: preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation 
(Mushkatel & Weschleer, 1985). Out of those four, the response phase presents the most socially complex 
phase of the disaster spectrum (Dynes, 1991). Disasters usually affect entire communities or large 
segments of social units and are present when the established social systems of the community abruptly 
cease to operate. Far from having a condition of social anomie, social systems continue to operate while 
new ones emerge because they have greatest knowledge of the community, and because they need to 
initiate recovery themselves as many of their needs will not be met by outside agencies. Haines, Hurlbert 
and Beggs actually find that disaster victims and their social networks mostly become resources (1996). In 
another study they also find that in the preparation phase 45 percent and in the recovery phase 63 percent 
of the individuals who provided informal support came from outside the core network (2000). On the 
other hand, differences in disaster perception and response vary on the basis of ethnicity, gender, 
socioeconomic status or educational level which is of importance for emergency planers (Fessenden-
Raden, Fitchen, & Health, 1987; Gallup Organization, 1986). The following studies support these 
findings. 
A study of the Flint-Beecher tornado of 1953 turned out that most of the 927 casualties were rescued 
by spontaneous local rescue groups. These informal teams tended to be based on some previously existing 
social relationship in the community, such as the family, the neighborhood, the school, friendship bonds 
and work associations. However, some groups were composed largely of strangers (Form et al., 1956). 
Similar results can be found for the Kobe’s Nishi Suma area where 60 percent of the residents in the were 
reported by their own efforts, 20 percent by neighbors (Shaw & Goda, 2004). After the Mexican 
earthquake of 1985, the organizational response was also dominated by a substantial amount of 
independent activity (Quarantelli, 1993). When Kobe and the Hyogo prefectures were struck by an 
 6
earthquake in 1995, voluntary engagement from Japan (approx. 1 Mio people helped) and around the 
world was  almost overwhelming for the local government (Tierney & Goltz, 1997). In a post-earthquake 
north-east Peru in 1990, informal community organizations were quick to respond but then ignored by 
official relief organizations (Schilderman, 1993). On the other hand, Buchanan found that NGOs may see 
themselves as close partners of a local community in disaster which might not see this in the same way 
(1996). Community or volunteer action are also not automatically effective as Form et al. note (1956). 
One person who is technically competent but not personally involved in the life of the community. 
 
3. Social Software and Social Networking Services 
The term Social software is used for software systems that are utilized for group communication and 
collaboration which thus foster building and managing social networks or publishing information and its 
dissemination (Allen, 2004). Blogs, discussion groups, Wikis, music streams with rating features, social 
networking platforms or picture sharing are examples of Social Software. They are mostly self organized 
by users, taking advantage of collective or swarm intelligence (Bonabeu & Meyer, 2001; Kennedy & 
Eberhart, 2001), replacing taxonomy with folksonomy (Guy & Tonkin, 2006) and bridge any kind of 
organizational or hierarchical boundaries.  
Social networking websites model real social networks in a virtual environment.  They assist each 
member in creating or seeking a network of friends, acquaintances, people who share the same interests or 
are of interest to the member. Access to the social networking platforms might be restricted to invitations 
by existing members only (i.e. aSmallworld, Orkut). Each member is encouraged to expand his or her 
network by inviting others to join and connecting with others. Each member also creates a personal 
profile, which may be very detailed to levels of personal relationship status or beyond. This information 
can be shared with all or restricted to a number of members within the network. Links that are made with 
existing users of platforms and added to ones network can also be controlled. Besides these functions, 
SNS might offer newsgroups around one or more sets of topics usually managed by members of the 
community, a personal blog, calendar, RSS, chat, classifieds and picture sharing functionality. While 
many of these platforms like Meetup allow bridging the virtual and physical presence thus mediating 
social process, they are not ubiquitous. As a result, a person can not take advantage of the social network 
once disconnected from the internet. Appearing in 1998 in Japan Lovegetty, which allowed users to find 
“love matches” based on a basic set of profiles, marked the first attempt to bridge this gap (Iwatani, 1998). 
Now ventures like Dodgeball or Sociallight are offering mobile device-based systems that help people 
coordinate social activities. The MIT based project Serendipity combines ones profile, social network and 
weighing of different factors with Bluetooth technology to find known and people of interest via ones 
mobile phone (Eagle & Pentland, 2005). The popular Japanese social networking platform Mixi as well as 
the system utilized in the case studies is also mobile friendly.  
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People can have memberships in different online social networks out of the over 300 available, which 
can serve narrowly or broad defined interests or purposes. However, this makes it difficult for people to 
decide where to go and how much time they should devote to each of their online identities. Users might 
also be in a dilemma through the way new ties are made (What happens if one says no?) and integrated 
into ones network (access to more personal information, granting the new tie a basic level of reputation 
visible for the other members of ones network).  Moreover, sites already carry redundant data (user 
profile/content side) and are very likely only able cover parts of a user’s offline social network. Just like 
with Instant Messaging systems the open Source movement might come up with tools that allow for a 
macro management of each site or standard protocol in the future.  
Although in the past online networks have been treated as isolated entities, it has now been proofed 
that online networks and the internet are indeed social networks that increase interaction, the size and 
variety of interpersonal ties, especially useful for maintaining weak ties in between face-to-face 
encounters (Tindall & Wellman, 2001). As shown above these online social networks can support or 
initiate social interaction or action in the offline world. 
 
4. Methods 
4.1 Research Design 
The study has a qualitative exploratory case study design (Hartley, 2004). As this research tries to 
answer questions like “Why did they start local SNS”, “How did they do it?” or “How could it be used in 
disaster” about a contemporary set of events, the choice of case study research seemed to be the plausible 
(Yin, 2003, p.: 9). As for the research design I chose that of an exploratory, multiple-case study because I 
explore an emerging phenomenon where there is little to none knowledge available. Questions that did not 
cover the general areas of organization, motivation, implementation or impact were influenced by the 
literature on social capital, social network and disaster.  
4.2 Sources of data 
Since Japanese SNS started in Yatsushiro it was assumed that it could provide the most developed 
environment to study. Nagaoka city was one of the two national pilot projects in early 2006 of MIC to test 
the use of SNS and disaster. Fortunately, there was no disaster to truly test its application but involved 
actors had more experience with disasters and spent the more time thinking about it. I used informants and 
archival data for information gathering.  
Four categories of informants were interviewed: Elected officials, executive level administrators, mid-
level administrators (disaster section, citizen relations section and IT section) and NPO members. 
Additionally, I interviewed a researcher of the Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM) of the 
International University of Japan whose research on social networks covered local SNS before conducting 
the case study. In sum 7 people were interviewed in Yatsushiro and 9 in Nagaoka. Table 1 gives an 
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overview of the interviewee categories for each city. Introductions to and suggestions for Interviewees 
were arranged by the key actor of the local SNS project’s so that a slight bias in favor of the actors and 
their project can be assumed. Interviews were semi-structured and covered various areas such as 
perception of SNS, implementation, management, impact, user behavior and local SNS application in 
disasters. 
 
Category/City Yatsushiro Nagaoka 
Elected Officials 0 1 
Executive level administrators 2 2 
Mid-level administrators 4 4 
NPO 1 2 
  Table 1: Case interviewees per category 
 
Guiding questions can be found in Appendix I. Questions that covered local SNS implementation or 
operation were skipped for those not directly involved. All interviews were between 60 and 90 minutes 
and were recorded when permitted. Questions were first asked in English and then translated by the 
interpreter. Answers were also translated by the interpreter. This process caused the interview process to 
be longer. In terms of archival data, I reviewed internal presentations or whitepaper about local SNS and 
disaster plans. Master students also reviewed each local SNS platform. 
 
4.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection occurred in October and November 2006. Both cities were visited for three days. 
Interview notes were structured around different topics using the guiding questions as a schema. Once the 
initial set of data was prepared, I reviewed and compared it to information received in the GLOCOM 
interview and work done by (Hamaya, 2005) for verification. The second step consisted of a chronological 
and non interpreted summary for each case. In the third step I did a cross-case analysis in line with the 
answer behavior for each question. The main purpose was to identify emerging patterns of perceptions and 
the like. Finally, I tried to match results from social capital and disaster research for connecting case data 
with the broader discussion of the usefulness of local SNS and disaster.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Yatsushiro City, Kumamoto Prefecture 
Yatsushiro is the second largest city of the Kumamoto prefecture and is centrally located about 40 
km from the Kyushu west coast, the southernmost of the four Japanese islands. In August 2005 Yatsushiro 
merged with the municipalities of Izumi, Kagami, Sakamoto, Sencho and Toyo as part of Japanese 
municipal government reforms and has a population of approximately 140.000. Beginning with 3,232 
municipalities in March 1999 the reforms decreased the number of municipalities by 40% (1,821 cities) in 
the seven year period which ended in March 2006. As part of these changes new shopping centers opened 
up in the suburbs forcing smaller shops in the city center to close which was formerly a common place to 
meet people. The main issues for the area with regard to disaster are flooding after Typhoons. According 
to a city official internet penetration is around 46% due to the high number of older people in the city and 
the region in general. 
 
A committee consisting of members from all sections decided to offer citizens a way to communicate 
and find likeminded friends online as part of their eGovernment efforts in 2002/2003. “Gorotto Yatchiro” 
opened up besides the official website. It offered a bulletin board, calendar, link posting and email form 
functionality. However, it never got quite of the ground with a final community size of 600, 40 truly active 
users and 10.000 page views per month. Usage decreased over time and since membership offered 
anonymity some members did not stick to accepted conventions of online behaviour. As for Japanese 
culture, this keeps a lot of people critical of such initiatives paired with general mistrust in government 
and public administration in Japan (Pharr, 1997). More than 900 local governments around Japan had set 
up citizens’ virtual conference rooms by 2004 as part of their eParticipation efforts. Though, most of these 
projects met the same fate as the one in Yatsushiro city. In response and inspired by bigger and popular 
social networking platforms such as Mixi, Mr. Takao Kobayashi, a young member of the IT department, 
decided to design and program a new version of Gorotto in 2004. The above mentioned eGovernment 
committee did not exist anymore, so he was neither ordered to do so nor did he ask for permission. 
Executives still knew about his project though. The lack of visible leadership is related to the fact that top-
level administrators are older and change their position every 2 years which is common for Japanese 
public administration. Therefore, when leaving, not only is knowledge lost but also any kind of support or 
interest. A senior manager with over 40 years working for government, says that those in charge have 
sometimes no interest or understanding of ICT which are in direct relation to each other. Nevertheless, 
they have to make the concepts and policies for ICT. Related policies or concepts are now left to some 
younger administrators which were less influential.  
Within three months he developed the first version of the “Open-Gorotto” Social Networking 
Services using openSource software as Free BSD, PostgreSQL, and PHP. Except for being inspired by 
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existing social networking platforms no additional surveys were conducted. As the platform is hosted on 
government servers and development was done in work and free-time costs can be considered 
insignificant. Up to this day there is no additional budget set aside. Mr. Kobayashi mentions four points 
that motivated him to create the SNS platform: First, citizens are much better at sharing government 
information, so each citizen’s network serves as a multiplier. Second, the platform helps the community to 
grow stronger, meaning that people who share mutual interests can get together in a pleasant atmosphere. 
Third, the platform presents general and government information in a different way. Finally, 
administrators can interact and learn from citizens, thus improving the citizen government relationship. 
Disaster is missing here but was picked up by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) 
as a goal. MIC conducted empirical testing of local SNS communities in the City of Nagaoka which will 
be described in the next section and in Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward in early 2006. Other administrators hope 
that SNS will help citizens to help each in every day problem solving.   
The SNS platform exists parallel to the Yatsushiro city website which links to the former. “Open 
Gorotto” functionality includes a blog, networking, personal profile, picture/media library, calendar and 
newsgroups. Its uniqueness compared to sites like Mixi, Gree, MySpace, LinkedIn or Xing lies in 
additional features as GIS/Google maps mash-up (see Figure 1) open architecture with allows for 
Figure 1: Open Gorotto Map functionality. Users can tag or link to the map and share it. 
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integration of other features. With regard to disaster the platform offers an automatic fire alert service and 
hazard overview for the map feature.  Besides that the platform is mobile friendly. Although everybody 
can use the platform registered users can also invite contacts. In order to prevent a development similar to 
the bulletin board “Open Gorotto” includes the “Alien” or “Grey Person” feature. This automatically scans 
for swearwords and the like and also sends a quick note to the administrator (Mr. Kobayashi) and another 
person supporting him with this task.  
Since the new version was put online by end of 2004 member expansion was left to invitations of 
users only. Mr. Kobayashi thinks that this allows developing a healthier online community and avoiding 
the objections citizens might have towards more visible government involvement although it is much 
slower. This opinion is shared by all other interviewed administrators. Advertising was only done through 
links on the city website, flyers and ads in the city magazine. Additional public attention came through 
press articles first in the regional and later in national press which is visible in higher website traffic after 
key interviews. The platform also received two awards from MIC. As of today, the platform has around 
2800 members with 70% being from Yatsushiro. Average age of members is 39 with males tending to be 
more active than females (ratio: 7:3). 400 users can be counted as truly active in terms of their blog, 
commenting or in forum behavior. The most used features are the diary followed by the internal email 
system and forums. 400 users have also subscribed the RSS feature. Smaller forums are managed by 
citizens; bigger ones are managed by the administrators. 100 members of the community belong to the 
local administration or politics. Mr. Kobayashi did not decide on particular measures upfront to check the 
success of the platform. Though in the interview, Mr. Kobayashi mentioned that he would look for the 
number of well connected people on the platform as an indicator for measuring how well the online 
community of Yatsushiro has developed. So for him community size is not necessarily a sign for network 
quality. 
 
Ms. Yukari, the leader of a local environmental NPO, is one of the active users of  “Gorotto 
Yatchiro” and also on the cities committee on environmental issues where she first learned about the local 
SNS platform. She started writing environmental essays on her blog which drew a lot of attention and 
comments from other members, even those who lived in Kanagawa prefecture close to Tokyo. Moreover, 
more people joined the NGO and over 500 locals came to one of their events which were mainly marketed 
through the SNS. Out of her 30 contacts 15 are random people she got to know through the online 
platform and who share the same interests. Due to their general lack of interest in technology all the older 
people she knows showed no motivation in joining. The city hopes that the SNS helps reviving NPO 
activities in the area by allowing them to interact with the wider and younger public. Interviewees say that 
they and their friends joined the SNS because of its fun factor like sharing information about where to eat 
good food. Another interviewee pointed out that in the past many people mainly build their networks 
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around their friends from elementary or high-school. Now they can find others that share the same interest 
in sports or food which is especially helpful for those moving from somewhere else. 
 
Those interviewed in administration admitted that they have no further ideas how they could take 
advantage of the SNS in or before a disaster than using it as a source of information dissemination to the 
public. Someone from the disaster section mentioned that citizens could add value to recovery operations 
by posting pictures and remarks on damages to their blog but there would be no one to check at the 
moment. Mr. Kobayashi said that people from other, far away areas that are only connected to very few 
members of  “Gorotto Yatchiro” feel more connected through the network and thus are more likely to 
offer support. A story of the results of Ms. Yukari’s actions during a flood seems to strengthen this 
assumption. She put information and a picture about the severely damaged house and family of her son’s 
friend on her local SNS blog. Within days the family received rice, towels and other things from random 
people. Regardless, currently local SNS is not part of the cities disaster plan.  
 
Mr. Kobayashi received attention throughout the country and is currently the most influential actor 
when it comes to the topic of local government SNS. It is his hope that all local governments will build 
similar SNS, and that numerous community-based SNS will be developed alongside each other. These 
SNS mirror each other and are interconnected so that members can access their local as well as other 
networks even when there is a disruption/failure caused by a disaster or similar.  Future functionality 
should include shopping and displaying user’s network maps.  
 
5.2 Nagaoka, Niigata Praefecture 
Nagaoka is a city located in the center of Niigata prefecture spanning from the northern coast inland 
of Japan’s main island Honshu. Just like Yatsushiro, Nagaoka merged with a couple of surrounding cities 
and towns between April 2005 and January 2006 increasing its population by approximately 100.000. 
Nagaoka was completely destroyed during Second World War and always had to cope with some form of 
disaster (earthquakes, snow, flood). This fact left its distinctive mark on the now roughly 283.000 people 
living in Nagaoka and is a reason why the Phoenix was chosen as a symbol of the city. The recovery of 
the Chuuetsu earthquake in October 2004 is still taking place in some mountainous areas. The community 
is said to be still better connected in those rural areas than in the city. According to city officials internet 
penetration is now at 60%. During the earthquake the internet and basic mobile messaging were the only 
communication channels working. The citizen government relationship is described as top down. 
However, some think that putting government information online and volunteer activities would help in 
equalizing it. 
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Before Nagaoka introduced the local SNS platform, it had a web bulletin board besides its official 
city website. Citizens showed the same frustration with the language and inappropriate behavior of some 
users which led many to abandon the platform. The city’s local SNS called “Ococo Nagaoka” was 
introduced in mid December 2005. As it is based on “Open Gorotto” I will not go into detail about its 
functionality. By now (December 2006) there are 600 registered users compared to 300 at the end of the 
MIC test phase in February.  Only a few forums around casual topics like food eco-tourism can be 
considered active. The local SNS was marketed through publications in city newspapers and banners on 
the city website. Opinion leaders were also invited by the NPO to join the SNS to facilitate user growth. In 
contrast, Mixi has 2000 members just for Nagaoka.  
 
The process that ultimately led to the Nagaoka local SNS started in 2004. Soiga, an NPO, originally 
founded for environmental activities in April 2004 used a blogs and RSS to inform the public when the 
region first experienced a severe flood in April and earthquake in October. They provided faster 
information than government which received wide media attention, especially when they took over 
communication after Nakanashima government was operational ineffective through flooding. The NPO 
tried to convince government officials later that year to start an official government blog but their idea was 
rejected because nobody saw any need or importance in it. Thereafter, the head of the NPO was asked by 
MIC to join a newly formed working group on local SNS. The group consisted of academics, members 
from MIC and members of local administrators among them Mr. Kobayashi. They formed two groups to 
cover the theoretical and implementation/system aspects. First, they all looked at Mixi and Gree as the 
majority of them had never heard of SNS or used it before. To get the funds, the official project goal was 
officially about improving civic participation in Nagaoka and Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward. Although they 
could not think of a different kind of use, improved information sharing in disasters was a secondary 
object. MIC covered the costs (¥ 1,500.000) for the local SNS pilot phase whereas the NPO was asked to 
manage it and work together with local government. Running costs are at around ¥ 30,000 per month. 
 
When Nagaoka’s local SNS started, many sections except for information policy did not understand 
the SNS concept and why Nagaoka was chosen. In fact, of those interviewed, many admit that they are 
still wondering what SNS is all about, why they should put their information online and how it could be 
further utilized for government.  Many immediately joined Mixi to get a feeling for SNS. Perceptions of 
local SNS vary. The dominating view is that local SNS provides a convenient location for communication 
and information sharing for citizens and government. In the past neighbourhood associations (NA) were 
the link between government and citizens. However, most leaders and people in the NA are now very old 
and lack knowledge or interest in the use of IT. Some interviewees think it could complete or add value to 
real-life relationships. People could help each other more by learning more about each other, what they 
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could do for the community and as a result rely less on government. One mentions a group that started 
discussing how to have a nicer city and improve economic growth which members first got to each other 
through the local and later offline. A member of the disaster section adds that it is strengthening the 
community by building broad networks between the newly merged cities. Sceptics think that there are 
more dominating means of communication like mobile phones. A council member, who uses multiple 
blogs and the SNS, thinks that the level of impact on the community of the local SNS is low. To stress this 
point he compares his networks on Mixi (112 contacts) and the local SNS (12 contacts). In general though, 
SNS helped the council member to interact with the younger community.  
 
When the Chuuetsu earthquake happened government facilities were severely damaged forcing 
citizens to completely rely on themselves. In the town of Yamakoshi people gathered in the center to 
check on each other. A senior manager of the disaster section underlines that during this period 
community strength, meaning social networks become very important. The disaster section tries to 
strengthen the community by handing out information about how to prepare, what can be done and how to 
form a disaster community. For a long time these measures were not necessary as people helped were well 
connected locally. Each ward is asked to organize volunteer disaster groups that train once a year. At the 
moment there are 500 of these groups in Nagaoka which include 30-100 households.  
 
Local SNS is another way of strengthening the community and preventing people to panic by keeping 
them informed in a convenient way – if there is no complete power outage. Its direct tie to local 
government allows it to have the 2nd highest level of information credibility. However, because most 
people join for the local SNS platform fun, it will be difficult for government to encourage people to join 
by making disaster preparation and information its key selling point. Furthermore, the speed of 
information sharing has its downsides. First, in small disasters people and government can rely on the 
information provided by citizens, in larger disasters citizen information lacks quality but exceeds quantity. 
Government is in a dilemma because the SNS medium demands quick information but they are still 
required to be exact. Second, since information spreads quickly, reactions can interfere with government 
plans or operations. He tells the story of someone who wrote about a community that was out of supplies 
for diaper which thereafter got “flooded” with donated diapers. The rising volunteers are also hard to 
organize. According to administrators it took them over a week to somehow coordinate volunteers 
effectively in the recovery phase of the 2004 earthquake. In contrast, NGO/NPO members think 
government never realized that.  
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Currently the members of Soiga are working on an updated version which should be online by early 
2007. The biggest change lies in the use of the Google Maps API. They are as well talking about online 
advertisement space and how to attract more users to the platform. Significant changes to “Open Gorotto” 
can only be introduced if they are implemented by Mr. Kobayashi or someone with his skills.  
 
6. Discussion 
Before taking a closer look at the role of SNS and disaster I would like to begin by discussing some 
interesting aspects of the cases. The last paragraph ended with the key role of Mr. Kobayashi for the future 
development and functionalities of the platform. He started this local SNS completely on his own, inspired 
by the rise of private social networking platforms and personal interest in technology. His government 
membership and high level of involvement ensure the sustainability of “Gorotto Yatchiro”.  By 
comparison, “Ococo Nagaoka” is in a critical situation because government officials mainly evaluate 
success by the quantity of users and their activity and the NPO, although well connected, has less 
leverage. Many online activities (i.e. exchanges) are depending on a critical mass for others to be 
attractive, a criteria which has not been met in both cases (1%< of the total population) and mostly include 
older generations. In addition both are competing with big platforms like Mixi. If the local SNS has more 
users, the load on technology and burden on involved managers will also grow. Although officials claim 
to learn something from citizens there is nobody checking the information of citizens in their blogs. Mr. 
Kobayashi is right when pointing to the importance taking a gradual approach of getting more users and 
introducing the platform. However, government marketing is not helping much and poorly done which 
reminded me of discussions with administrators who were wondering about the slow user service uptake 
in their eGovernment projects. Although Mr. Kobayashi added the map feature, functionality and design 
of existing platforms led to an early framing of his understanding of the possibilities and limits of local 
SNS. The lack of feedback by other people in the creation process is certainly a reason why its use in 
disaster or the government citizen relationship is not fully exploited. Administrative members would also 
be more willing to join, add content and engage with the citizen if there would be a considerable and 
visible amount of support by executive level administrators. Again, Mixi and Gree formed their perception 
of SNS so that in their words local SNS is mainly a way to interact with the public and offer it a way to 
interact with each other. They miss the aspect of building social capital. Moreover, MIC should have 
planned a longer pilot phase since the tendency of a slow user uptake was already available in the data for 
Yatsushiro. Central government is still influential in Japan so MIC could have also done more to inform 
and motivate the public and administrators alike. 
 
 16
Even without knowing the respective research and terms interviewees made the correct assumptions 
about social networks or tell stories reflecting results of reviewed literature on social networks and social 
support in disaster. Drawing for example on the narrative of the family that was helped by many strangers 
after a the mother of a sons friend (weak tie) wrote about their flooded house in her “Gorotto Yatchiro” 
blog which supports Granovetter’s weak tie and Burt’s structural hole role in non routine activities (2004; 
, 1983). Those interviewees who joined the local SNS found new friends on the platform and expanded 
their social network as concluded by Tindall and Wellman (2001). Furthermore, Soiga NPO is a great 
example how an organization, once brought into existence for one set of purposes (environmental 
activities), can also aid others for different purposes described by Coleman, thus constituting social capital 
available for use (1988). The NPO’s blogs were considered a trusted source and can provide an alternative 
to the mass media which is regarded by many individuals as a more credible source of risk information 
than government (McComas, 2001). A centralized approach to the provision and publication of local 
information might not be fine-grained enough anyway to cater to the viral and capillary spread of word-of-
mouth information. This informal interaction can only be supported by recognizing the peer-to-peer nature 
of local interaction which is distinct from the conventional many-to-many, few-to-many, or one-to-many 
broadcast nature of other online interaction (Foth, 2006). In the past this role was taken by neighbourhood 
organizations which are already impacted by demographic and cultural change. 
Finally, if the majority of the population would be represented on local SNS platform sociograms  
could provide snapshots of networks and interaction structures. From these types of diagrams government 
and citizens can visually identify emergent positrons and clusters of interaction. By examining these 
patterns of mediated and unmediated interaction we gain an added perspective on communication 
structures that underpin explicit community processes as well as those that support affective, less 
instrumental behaviors (Garton, Haythornthwaite, & Wellman, 1997). Privacy might be a concern for 
citizens of course. At the moment, local SNS can serve the functions of managing and building social 
networks. In disasters it covers the areas of “observe and report” and “warn and inform”. Along the lines 
of La Porte, I argue that the design and rules of the network constrain the character, use and content of 
member roles and exchanges and the network (1996). Consequently, local SNS could support the 
community and government beyond its current scope which I will briefly outline in the next section. 
 
Design and Functionalities for local SNS in disaster 
A key challenge during the disaster is effective communication and information provision. The better 
information flow during the response phase, the better coordination among the responding forces and 
operations will be. The current local SNS serves its main purpose of allowing people to connect and share 
information well in non-emergency situation. However, it could provide functionality for the 
preparedness, response and recovery phases (Mushkatel & Weschleer, 1985). In preparation is important 
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to know what the available resources are, be they public or private, which need to be considered. Local 
SNS could make it mandatory for each user to enter data in to a “disaster profile” upon registration (See 
Table 1).  
Area Data 
Personal Name, address, contact information, alternative emergency contact, social 
network, special health issues (on an opt in basis) 
Address details Family members living in household, number of people living at the same 
location (i.e. neighbors in other apartments) 
Skills Professional (i.e. Doctor), Rescue (i.e. CPR), Other (i.e. scuba diving, 
climbing, caves) 
Tools/ Equipment Trained dog, Heavy equipment (i.e. caterpillar) 
Disaster Membership (disaster reponse organizations or military) 
Past Disaster response roles i.e. led SAR team 
Free text/ Important information  
Table 2: Disaster profile 
 
The disaster profile is shared with all other citizens. To keep members privacy they can decide which 
information in the disaster they would like share with whom. Yet government has full access. 
Additionally, existing volunteer disaster groups are asked to join as a whole and form their own online 
community on the local SNS. This will allow anybody to assess the information (i.e. people missing) 
mobilize action and fin the right. Besides, as bandwidth and becomes sparse and access increases quickly, 
functionalities and design need to be reduced to the basics. Images combined with GIS data can provide 
emergency managers with situational, real time information but sections need to include resources for that 
kind of content scanning activity in their disaster plans. If they would also do that in non-emergency 
situations public administration can very likely learn about various trends and needs within the 
community. Of course, if power supply fails in a broad area for a long time, local SNS would not valuable 
to anybody in that area. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this article I described the results of 2 small case studies of local SNS use in Japanese 
municipalities. While the Yatsushiro’s local SNS seems to be sustainable through its founder, Nagaoka’s 
local SNS is in decline. However, both have to compete with popular SNS like Mixi and lack critical 
mass. Furthermore, both platforms need more support through long term marketing and true executive 
support. Of course, any conclusions must be tentative, especially as a consequence of the non 
representative number of users and the lack of testing in a disaster of both SNS platforms. The literature 
on social networks, social capital, social support and disaster supports the positive effects of a well 
connected community. The literature on online social networking finds that SNS help creating, managing 
and expanding an individual’s social network, even maintaining weak ties. However, while disaster 
research can already draw on a rich stream of social network, social capital and social support it has not 
covered the area of social software. ICT in disaster have been well discussed but social software which 
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combines social capital and communication aspects is different. Thus, I make contributions to disaster 
research by providing a new, yet very specific approach to building and taking advantage of social capital. 
This article contributes to the research on eDemocracy and eParticipation by describing a new 
software tool and its embeddedness in the administrative organization. At least some indication for new 
ways of citizen government interaction can be found. Therefore, this article should motivate researchers of 
both fields to take further steps to integrate the role of social networking platforms in their research. Yet, 
creating sound data for a broader population will be difficult besides the difficulties of disaster research.  
This article also provides practitioners with a real life case study on the implementation and use of 
local SNS in government which as an attempt seems to be the first one in the world. Furthermore, I offer 
practitioners new perspectives on how to use social networking platforms in disaster by means of building 
social capital and the disaster profile. 
Finally, social capital can be a double-edged sword because it can effectively mobilize people as well 
as complicating decision making, coordination and control (Buckland & Rahman, 1999). But 
administrators who make full use of citizen expertise and energy will more effectively improve the safety 
and survival chances of their communities (Morrow, 1999). Twigg noted that community based activities 
are deeply rooted in the society and culture of an area, they enable people to express their real needs and 
priorities, allowing problems to be defined correctly and responsive measures to be designed and 
implemented (1999). Hence, other local governments should follow the Japanese attempt in utilizing local 
SNS. The positives effects are worth not to be neglected.  
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Appendix I 
Interview questions 
Please tell me something about you and your current activities 
Please describe your role with respect to the SNS project. 
What was your first impression of SNS? (if not directly involved in the SNS project) 
Could you summarize some lessons learned so far? (yourself, government) 
What goals would you like to accomplish with the SNS? 
Please describe the target group. 
How would your describe the local citizen government relationship? 
How did you get internal buy-in/support for the project? Who played an important role? 
How did you try to communicate to citizens to join the SNS? 
How do you include or let older people join? 
How did citizens react? (please describe some unique experiences) 
What additional value do you offer citizens that private SNS platforms like mixti do not offer? 
What do you know about the level of connectedness of the community (citizens) before and after the introduction of 
your SNS? 
What was your role in the implementation of SNS? 
What were the challenges in the implementation and operation of SNS? 
What were your considerations when defining design, features and policies of the SNS? 
How do you manage the network? 
What kinds of skills are needed to manage the network? 
How do you plan to measure if the community is better connected? 
How do you keep the SNS network alive and sustainable? 
Who is responsible for what in the network? 
How much control over the network do you have? 
What are you doing if technology fails? 
What can disrupt your operations? 
How would you define Social Capital? 
How did SNS change your way of information sharing with citizens?  
How do you improve internal / government networking and information sharing? 
How do you prepare (1) government, (2) partners and (3) citizens for disasters? (general procedures) 
What role does SNS play in the different phases of a disaster: (1) preparedness (2) response (3) recovery (4) 
mitigation?  
What is the advantage of having a community which is highly connected? 
What value can citizens add for government in disasters? 
What is your experience `with political and operational leadership during a disaster? 
Is there any interesting information you know about similar SNS projects and their role in disasters and E-democracy 
you could share with us? 
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